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Self-similarity is the property of a system being similar to a part of itself. We posit that a special
class of behaviourally self-similar systems exhibits a degree of resilience to adversarial behaviour.
We formalise the notions of system, adversary and resilience in operational terms, based on transition
systems and observations. While the general problem of proving systems to be behaviourally self-
similar is undecidable, we show, by casting them in the framework of well-structured transition
systems, that there is an interesting class of systems for which the problem is decidable. We illustrate
our prescriptive framework for resilience with some small examples, e.g., systems robust to failures
in a fail-stop model, and those avoiding side-channel attacks.
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1 Introduction
Building systems that are resilient to actions of adversarial environments is an important software engi-
neering concern. In this paper, we propose a class of systems whose resilience arises from a notion of
self-similarity. An object is said to be “structurally self-similar” if it is similar to a proper part of itself.
An important quality of the class of self-similar structures is that they are scale-invariant. In analogy, we
consider a class of systems that are behaviourally self-similar — the behaviour of the system as a whole
is “equivalent” to that of a part of the system — and develop a framework for showing how systems in
this class are resilient to adversarial actions. The intuition behind our thesis is that if a part of a system
is sufficient to exhibit the behaviour of the system as a whole, then the rest of the system provides re-
dundancy, which in turn may provide resilience against a hostile environment. The notion of resilience
is with respect to that of an adversary, a general concept pervading computing science, i.e., any way of
choosing inputs or an environment that can thwart a program from achieving its desired behaviour.
A trivial example of a behaviourally self-similar system is a constant signal. Its behaviour during
any interval of time is equivalent to its behaviour during an initial (arbitrarily small) interval, which is
repeated ad infinitum. The signal can be considered to be resilient to an adversary that determines when
to sample the output value, in that it is able to map the adversary’s sampling interval to a more convenient
input (the initial interval) for which its behaviour has been defined. Such “delay-tolerance” may also be
seen in other time-independent functions.
The notion of behavioural self-similarity finds common currency in formal languages, in concurrency
theory, as well as in programming. In formal languages, we have a ready example of a construction
that supports behavioural self-similarity, namely the Kleene star, as (e∗)∗ ≈ e∗. Note that the construct
( )∗ is semantically idempotent, a property that is often associated with fault-tolerance. The replication
operation in process calculi such as the pi-calculus [15] is another example of self-similarity: !p ≈!p‖!p,
where ≈ denotes (behavioural/semantic) equivalence. It is also idempotent since !!p≈!p, for any process
∗The second author was supported in part by NSF grant CNS-1228697
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p. Indeed, in any recursive program scheme, we can find a syntactic part that behaves in a manner similar
to the entire system. Consider, e.g., a recursive equation X ≈ F [X ], for some non-trivial context F[ ].
By construction, X is a fortiori operationally equivalent to the expression F[X ]. The semantics attached
to such recursive equations involves finding an appropriate fixed point, usually the least fixed point,
preferably by a (finite) iterative process. Observe that placing any solution to this equation in the context
F[ ] is a (behaviourally) idempotent operation1 .
From these examples, a naı¨ve idea arises linking system structure, behavioural self-similarity and
resilience: If, assuming no adversarial action, a part q of a system p can behave as the whole system
does, then this part can be considered to provide the core functionality of the system; the rest of the
system (the “context” C[ ], where p ≡ C[q]) serves to neutralise adversarial actions or transform the
interactions of the adversarial environment A with the system into a form which this “core” q can digest,
and thereby make the system behave as though adversarial action by A were absent.
Resilience. We say that a system p is resilient to an adversary A if its observable behaviour in the
presence of adversarial action is equivalent to its behaviour in the absence of the adversary: p ◦A ≈
p, where ◦ represents coupling the system p with the adversary A2. A somewhat similar formulation
has been explored earlier by Liu, Joseph, Peled, Janowski and others [14, 17, 11], but we believe our
formulation is more natural (discussed in §1.1). Now, if p can be expressed by C[q] as above, and in
the absence of an adversary, C[q] ≈ q, we have, by transitivity, the desired resilience to the adversary A
arising from self-similarity. Resilience in this sense should not be equated with a notion of correctness;
a system may be resilient even if it is not correct with respect to a given specification. Note that if ≈ is a
congruence, C[C[q]]≈C[q]≈ q, showing the expected idempotence of C[ ] in countering adversary A.
Adversary model. An adversary can be viewed as a way of forcing the program to face an un-
favourable environment. The class of adversaries may be expressed in any of a variety of ways: as
processes in a language, as automata or transition systems, as logical constraints on behaviour, etc. All
that our framework requires is that the program coupled with the adversary is a transition system on
which a reasonable notion of observational equality can be defined. We include in the class of adver-
saries a completely benign adversary, denoted 1A, who behaves as if there were no adversary present
when coupled with any system. If the adversarial model is specified as a transition system, we require
that it be well-structured, with 1A  A for any A in the class of adversaries.
We identify here some constraints on what an adversary can and cannot do. (i) Adversaries may
act in ways completely unrestricted by the system. (ii) Adversarial moves, except for announcement of
error, are not directly observable. This is justifiable in that most adversaries are sneaky, not bruiting their
actions, until and unless they wish to announce that they have defeated the system, i.e., a denouement err.
(iii) An adversary cannot directly prevent the system from making any observable move by removing
an enabled action. (iv) An adversary can, however, interact with the system, and make joint moves.
These interactions too may not be directly observable, but may cause the system to (eventually) produce
different observable effects from its normal behaviour.
Structure of the paper. In the sequel, we develop this idea by formalising the notions of a system’s
behaviour, adversarial action, resilience and a methodology for proving a system to be resilient, by fac-
1Finding the minimal fixed point context helps us avoid “needless redundancy”.
2Note that A need not be specified in the syntax of the language in which p is expressed, and that the notion of coupling of
the adversary to the system may be more general than the usual notion of parallel composition.
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toring a system into its “core” and fault-tolerant context. This is followed by a discussion of related work
(§1.1). Formalisation (§2) of both system and adversarial behaviour is done in the very general setting of
transition systems. We employ a process calculus notation for expressing processes, and the associated
structural operational semantics helps in relating structure to behavioural self-similarity. In this paper, we
use suitable notions of observation and equivalence, namely, those of barbs and bisimulation [16], since
we consider systems closed when coupled with an adversary. While other behavioural equivalences may
be considered, we chose bisimulation since it is the finest extensional notion of equivalence of observable
behaviour. Proposition 1 expresses the soundness of our proposed methodology.
In general, proving bisimilarity of transition systems, and consequently showing a system to be
behaviourally self-similar, is undecidable. However, we can show that this problem is decidable for
an interesting class of systems (Proposition 2) by using the framework of Well-Structured Transition
Systems (WSTS) [6]. The WSTS conditions required for establishing decidability seem to arise very
naturally from the constraints placed on the context and adversary.
We then illustrate our prescriptive framework for resilience with small examples (§3), such as sys-
tems robust to failures in a fail-stop model, and defeating side-channel attacks. In the examples in this
paper, which progress from finite to finite-control to infinite state systems, we do not propose any new
mechanisms for building resilient systems. We deploy the familiar armoury of devices — redundancy,
replication, retry, and repetition — for countering the arsenal at the adversary’s disposal. However,
our framework may be seen as providing a formal (methodological) justification of these constructions.
While fault-resistance has earlier been shown using rigorous mathematical techniques, we believe that
our use of the WSTS framework provides the basis for automated techniques for proving resilience, es-
pecially in the case of infinite-state systems. We illustrate our approach by conveying only the intuition
for the different examples, and omit the tedious details of the proofs. In §4, we conclude with a discus-
sion of our approach, its limitations, alternative frameworks for specifying and verifying resilience to
adversarial behaviour, as well as some directions for future work.
Methodology. Our proposed methodology is:
1. We identify a class of adversaries, with a least adversary 1A. Adversarial moves are not normally
observable, except perhaps for a final barb err.
2. We decompose the system process p into a core q which provides the basic functionality and
a (fault-resilient) context C[ ]. Thus p ≡ C[q]. In general, the context may be multi-holed. The
context C[ ] should not alter the core functionality of q. In particular, it should satisfy the following
conditions:
(a) C[ ] should permit q to make any of its possible moves, i.e., q −→ q′ implies C[q] −→C[q′]
and q ⇓ o implies C[q] ⇓ o;
(b) If C[ ] and q jointly make a move, then all of q’s possible barbs are preserved, i.e., if C[q] ⇓ o
and C[q]−→C′[q′] then C′[q′] ⇓ o;
(c) The context C[ ] (and its derivatives) should by itself contribute no observable barbs, i.e.,
C[ ] 6⇓ o for any o;
(d) No transition arising purely due to C[ ] disables the execution of the process q, i.e., if C[ ]−→
C′[ ], then (i) q ⇓ o implies C′[q] ⇓ o (since C[q] ⇓ o), and (ii) q−→ q′ implies C′[q]−→C′[q′].
3. We then specify the coupling p◦A of a process and an adversary as a transition system. Formally,
we will require that this transition system be a WSTS. In particular, this composite transition
system should exhibit the upward simulation property (defined in §2).
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4. To show resilience of p with respect to the adversary A, we show that q◦1A ≈ p◦A. This problem
is decidable for WSTSs with certain additional properties.
We dub the conditions on the context and the adversary listed above the self-similarity constraints.
Beyond finite-state systems. While our examples in this paper are small, our framework is not con-
fined to dealing with finite (or finite-state) systems, for which it may be easy to show the required bisim-
ilarity. Accordingly, we explore systems that provide sufficient structural properties to ensure that bisim-
ilarity is decidable. We find that Well-Structured Transition Systems (WSTSs) [6] provide a framework
in which we can formulate and verify resilience by virtue of self-similarity.
Consider first a simple version of the framework: Structural inclusion of q in C[q] for a context
satisfying the self-similarity conditions is an obvious candidate when defining an ordering relation (q‖r
C[q]‖r). A simple way to obtain the conditions on context C[ ] mentioned above is to constrain the hole(s)
[ ] in context C[ ] to appear only at “head” or “enabled” positions. This allows C[q] to simulate q, and if
C[ ] has no observable actions, then every barb of q is a barb of C[q] and vice versa.
Often the adversary itself can be formulated as a WSTS with a least element 1A representing the
absence of an adversary. The composite transition system is obtained from those of the system and the
adversary, and a pointwise combination of the system and adversary orderings yields the desired ordering
relation for the WSTS. We say that the composition with adversary A is monotone if p −→ p′ implies
p◦A −→ p′ ◦A, and p ⇓ o implies p◦A ⇓ o. This is usually the case with parallel composition in most
process calculi.
The self-similarity constraints on the context and adversary imply the following properties:
• (Upward simulation) q −→ q′ implies C[q] −→ C[q′]. For monotone compositions with adver-
saries, this further implies C[q]◦A −→C[q′]◦A.
• For an observable o, q ⇓ o if and only if C[q] ⇓ o.
• if A −→ A′ then for any p: p◦A −→ p◦A′.
What remains is to place reasonable effectiveness constraints on the WSTSs in order to ensure that
bisimilarity is decidable. We require that the states of the system and the class of adversaries are recur-
sive sets and that the ordering  is decidable. We also assume that the transition systems are finitely-
branching. In order to ensure decidability, we require that the transition systems satisfy a technical
condition of having an effective pred-basis, and exhibit downward reflexive simulation (these definitions
are recalled in §2).
1.1 Contributions and Related Work
We are unaware of any previous work where the notion of self-similarity has been wedded to that of
behavioural equivalence to formulate a notion of a system being resilient to actions by an adversarial
environment. Furthermore, we believe that the methodology we enunciate — construing a system as
being constructed of a core behaviour and a context for handling the actions of a formally defined ad-
versarial environment — is novel, as also casting them in the framework of Well-Structured Transition
Systems [6]. The structural decomposition of the system into core and fault-absorbing context seems
natural and dovetails nicely with the WSTS conditions. As a consequence, the bisimulation proofs be-
come much easier. Moreover, the effectiveness conditions provide decidability, and thus in principle at
least, support automated techniques for showing resilience that can work even for infinite-state systems.
We also believe that our third example, which deals with a building block for converting communication
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over a non-FIFO channel with omission failures to a FIFO-channel with omission failures, has not been
presented earlier in its essential form.
The idea of formulating fault tolerance in terms of behavioural equivalence is not new [14, 17, 11].
The idea of a fault preorder, capturing the relative severity of faults, can be found in the works of
Janowski, Krishnan and others [11, 12, 14]. Janowski, e.g., studies the problem of monotonicity of
fault tolerance — a system tolerant of faults higher in the preorder should tolerate faults lower in the
preorder, but finds that this requirement does not square well with the standard notion of bisimilarity.
A similar observation is made by Krishnan [12], where he considers replicated systems to model sys-
tems with synchronous majority voting. Accordingly, a notion of bisimilarity parameterised by the fault
model is proposed [11, 12]. In contrast, we believe that the notion of behaviour should be uniform and
therefore formulate the notion of resilience to an adversary using a standard notion of equivalence, e.g.,
weak (asynchronous) barbed bisimulation [16, 2].
Another major difference with these approaches [10, 11] is that they formulate the faulty versions
of the system by incorporating the anticipated faulty behaviour into definitions of the system. We see
this is as unsatisfactory in that the adversarial behaviour has to be expressed concretely and within the
syntax of the system (e.g., in the CCS formulation), thereby severely restricting the expressive power
given to the adversary. It is also not a very satisfactory way of composing adversaries. Janowski uses the
technique of incorporating the faulty version with the original system by providing a redefinition of the
original system taking a non-deterministic choice of the two behaviours. This approach does not work
well, e.g., with modelling a fail-stop model, because “revenant” processes become possible — a system
which is supposed to have failed, rises Lazarus-like and exhibits some active behaviour. In contrast, our
formulation uses a very general framework of transition systems, which may be specified and combined
in any convenient manner. Indeed, the syntactic formulation used for describing the example systems
is only a convenient way for specifying a transition system and the constructive nature of fault-resilient
transformations.
There is also some similarity between our work and that of Liu, Joseph, Peled and others, in e.g.,
[14, 17], where they present frameworks in which fault-tolerance is expressed by transforming a process
with respect to the specification of a fault model: q is a ψ-tolerant implementation of p if p ≈ T (q,ψ),
for a transformation T ( , ). The juxtaposition of the recovery algorithm is viewed as a transformation
that makes a process fault-tolerant. The connections between these logic-based ideas and our preliminary
operational formulation deserves further study.
2 The Framework
2.1 Transition Systems
A transition system T = 〈S,−→〉 consists of a set of states S and a transition relation −→⊆ S×S. A finite
trace σ with respect to T is a sequence of states 〈s0,s1, . . . ,sn〉 such that si −→ si+1 for all 0 ≤ i < n.
An infinite trace with respect to T can be considered to be a function σ : N→ S such that for all i ∈ N:
σ(i)−→ σ(i+1). We write σ1σ2 to denote the concatenation of traces, which in the case of σ1 being an
infinite trace, results in σ1.
The successors and predecessors of a state s ∈ S, are defined as Succ(s) = {s′ | s −→ s′} and
Pred(s) = {s′ | s′ −→ s} respectively. The notations −→n, −→=, −→+ and −→∗ are used for the
n-step iteration, reflexive closure, transitive closure and reflexive-transitive closure of the transition re-
lation −→. We use a similar notation for the n-step iterations, and closures of Succ and Pred. T is
finitely-branching if Succ(s) is finite for each s.
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Assuming a notion of observable actions, we define a barb as an observable action that a process
has the potential to perform, written p ↓ o (where o is observable) [16]. We will use “weak barbs” which
depict the potential of a process to perform an observable action after making some “silent” transitions,
i.e., p ⇓ o if for some p′, p −→∗ p′ and p′ ↓ o.
A weak barbed simulation is a binary relation R on processes such that if (p1, p2) ∈ R, then (1) if
p1 ⇓ o then p2 ⇓ o; and (2) whenever p1 −→∗ p′1 then there exists p′2 such that p2 −→∗ p′2 and (p′1, p′2) ∈
R. R is a weak barbed bisimulation if both R and its symmetric inverse R−1 are weak barbed simulations.
Processes p1 and p2 are weakly barbed bisimilar, written p1 ≈b p2, if they are related by some weak
barbed bisimulation. Weak barbed bisimulation is not fine enough to distinguish processes that differ
after the first communication (barb), when they interact with other processes, so the equivalence relation
usually desired is a refinement that is preserved under parallel composition.
p1 ≈ p2 if ∀ q : (p1‖q)≈b (p2‖q)
However, for closed systems, it is reasonable to use weak barbed bisimulation as the notion of equiva-
lence.
Process notation. In our examples, we employ a process calculus notation akin to a value-passing
CCS. Let a represent a channel, x a variable, and v a value drawn from some set of values. We assume
without further specification that the language includes a syntactic category of expressions e, which
contains in particular variables and integer-valued expressions. In our examples, expressions may also
include tuples, and we assume a matching operation. Terms in the language of communicating processes,
typically p, p1, p2 are specified inductively by the following abstract syntax:
p ::= 0 | ae.p | ax.p1 | p1‖p2 | (a)p1 | p1 + p2 | [e1 = e2]p | !p | P(e1, . . .en)
The process 0 is inert. The prefix ae stands for the output of the value of e on channel a, whereas
ax.p stands for input of a value over channel a with the value bound to x in the continuation p. p1‖p2
represents parallel composition whereas p1 + p2 stands for non-deterministic choice between p1 and p2.
The notation (a)p1 describes the restriction operation on channels, i.e., channel a is local to scope p1.
Communication on restricted channels is not observable. [e1 = e2]p is a conditional matching operation.
!p represents the replication of process p, yielding as many copies of p as desired, running in parallel.
For convenience, we include parameterized (recursive) processes of the form P(e1, . . .en).
In a distributed system, we associate processes with locations, written for instance as ℓ[|p|], where ℓ is
a location constant. A context C[ ] is a process term with a hole [ ] in the place of a process term. We may
also have multi-hole contexts. We do not present here the formal rules for the operational semantics of
this language. Indeed, these constructs can be encoded in a core asynchronous calculus with replication
and choice restricted to guarded processes. We refer the reader to any standard presentation of such
asynchronous calculi [9, 2] for the encodings and the operational semantics rules.
2.2 Well-structured Transition Systems
We now summarise some results about WSTSs [6].
A quasi-order or pre-order 〈S,〉 consists of a set S with any reflexive and transitive relation ⊆ S×S.
〈S,〉 is well-ordered (henceforth a wqo) if for any infinite sequence s0,s1, . . . there exist indices i and
j with i < j such that si  s j. Consequently, a wqo has no infinite strictly decreasing sequence, nor any
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infinite sequence of unrelated elements. It also follows that in a wqo, any infinite sequence s0,s1, . . . has
an infinite non-decreasing subsequence si0  si1  si2 . . . where i0 < i1 < i2 . . ..
In quasi-order 〈S,〉, an upward-closed set is any set I ⊆ S such that if x ∈ I and x  y, then y ∈ I. Let
↑ x = {y | x  y}, called the upward closed set induced by x. A basis for an upward closed set I is a set
Ib ⊆ I such that I =
⋃
x∈Ib(↑ x).
Higman’s Lemma states that if 〈S,〉 is a wqo, then any upward-closed set I has a finite basis. The
minimal elements of I form a basis, and these must be finite, since otherwise, they would include an
infinite sequence of unrelated elements. Further, any chain of upward-closed sets I0 ⊆ I1 ⊆ I2 ⊆ . . .
stabilises, i.e., for some k, I j = Ik for every j ≥ k.
A Well-Structured Transition System (WSTS) T = 〈S,−→,〉 consists of a transition system 〈S,−→〉
equipped with a well-ordered quasi-order 〈S,〉 that satisfies weak upward simulation: For every s, s′,
and t ∈ S, if s −→ s′ and s  t, then there exists t ′ ∈ S such that t −→∗ t ′ and s′  t ′.
A WSTS exhibits downward reflexive simulation if for each s, if s −→ s′ and t  s, then there exists t ′
such that t −→= t ′ and t ′  s′, i.e., either t ≡ t ′ (0 steps) or t −→ t ′ (1 step).
A WSTS T = 〈S,−→,〉 has an effective pred-basis [6] if there exists an algorithm that, given any
state s ∈ S, computes pb(s), a finite basis of ↑ Pred(↑ s), i.e., minimal elements of the upward-closed set
induced by the predecessors of states in the upward-closed set induced by s.
Backward reachability analysis involves computing Pred∗(J) as the limit of a chain Ji, where Ji ⊆ Ji+1.
If J is upward-closed, then this process converges, and Pred∗(J) is upward-closed. If a WSTS T =
〈S,−→,〉 has an effective pred-basis and  is decidable, then if any upward-closed J is given via its
finite basis, one can compute a finite basis of Pred∗(J).
The covering problem is, given states s and t, to decide whether there exists a t ′ such that s −→∗ t ′ and
t  t ′. The covering problem is decidable for T = 〈S,−→,〉 with an effective pred-basis and decidable
.
If T = 〈S,−→,〉 exhibits downward reflexive simulation, and if Succ is computable and  decidable,
then one can compute for any s a finite basis of ↑ Succ∗(s).
The sub-covering problem is to decide, given s and t, whether there exists t ′ such that s −→∗ t ′ and
t ′  t. Subcovering is decidable for any WSTS which shows downward reflexive simulation, if Succ is
computable and  decidable.
Putting the pieces together, we get the following method for proving whether a putatively fault-
tolerant process p ≡ C[q] is indeed resilient (or not) to an adversary A, where C[ ] denotes the fault-
digesting context and q its core functionality:
Proposition 1 A process p is resilient to adversary A while providing behaviour q if p can be expressed
as C[q] such that C[ ] and A satisfy the self-similarity constraints, and C[q]◦A 6⇓ err.
Proof: Consider C[q]◦A. We wish to show q◦1A ≈C[q]◦A.
• Upward Simulation: The adversary does not directly restrict any action of the system. Since 1A
represents the non-existence of an adversary, q◦1A −→ t implies t ≡ q′ ◦1A for some q′. If q ⇓ o,
then clearly q ◦ 1A ⇓ o and also C[q] ⇓ o. If composition with the adversary is monotone, then
C[q]◦A ⇓ o. In general, this may not be the case (as will be seen in the second example of §3). If
for a context C[ ], upward simulation is not satisfied, then that context fails to provide resilience to
the adversary A3.
3The above-mentioned second example satisfies the WSTS condition only for certain contexts amongst contexts that satisfy
the other self-similarity conditions 2(a)-2(d).
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• Downward reflexive simulation: The adversary or its interaction with the system does not cause
anything that the core cannot do. Since the context C[ ] and the adversary do not contribute ob-
servables (except the “denouement”), C[q] ◦A ⇓ o implies either q ⇓ o or that the process is not
resilient to adversary A (if o is the barb err). (The first example in §3 involves an adversary that
attempts to make observable the barb err.) Now consider the moves that C[q]◦A can make. These
may be
1. a move due to q: C[q] −→ C[q′]. This is downward simulated by q −→ q′ (and hence q ◦
1A −→ q′ ◦1A).
2. a move due to only C[ ]: C[q] −→C′[q]. This is downward simulated by q making no move.
Moreover, C[q] ⇓ o iff C′[q] ⇓ o iff q ⇓ o.
3. a move due to A: C[q] ◦A −→C[q] ◦A′. Since the adversary’s moves are unobservable, this
is downward simulated by q◦1A making no move, since 1A 2 A′.
4. a move involving both C[ ] and q: C[q]−→C′[q′]: this is simulated by q−→ q′, and C′[q′] ⇓ o
iff q′ ⇓ o, since q′ C′[q′] and C′[ ] does not contribute any observables and does not inhibit
any observables of q′.
5. A move involving the adversary and the fault-handling context C[ ]: C[q] ◦A −→C′[q] ◦A′.
Again, since this move is unobservable, this is downward simulated by q ◦ 1A making no
move, since q◦1A C′[q]◦A′ for C′[ ],A′.
⊡
Thus, our prescriptive framework of crafting self-similar processes and formalising adversarial be-
haviour operationally yields the desired resilience. If the two systems are not barbed bisimilar, then the
process is not fault tolerant, and a counter-example may be found. Another way of looking at the def-
inition of resilience is that adversarial moves keep the composite system within the same behavioural
equivalence class.
Dealing with infinite state systems. Since the state spaces may potentially be infinite, there may not
be an effective method to prove that C[q] ◦A and q ◦ 1A are bisimilar. In order for this question to be
decidable, we place the restrictions mentioned earlier, namely that the WSTS has an effective pred-basis,
that the successor relation is effectively computable, and that the conditions on adversarial moves ensure
reflexive downward simulation. The “self-similar subterm” orderings are clearly decidable.
Proposition 2 The problem of deciding whether a process is resilient to an adversary is decidable if
in addition to satisfying the self-similarity constraints, the coupled transition system has an effective
pred-basis, and the successor relationship is effectively computable.
Proof: Suppose q◦1A −→ t. We need to show that there is a t ′ such that C[q] ◦A −→∗ t ′ and t  t ′.
This is an instance of the covering problem for C[q]◦A and t, which is decidable under the assumptions.
Proof technique: Compute Kb, the finite basis of Pred∗(↑ t), and check if C[q]◦A ∈↑ Kb.
Now suppose C[q] ◦A −→ t. We need to show that there is a t ′ such that q −→∗ t ′ and t ′  t. This is
an instance of the sub-covering problem for q and t, which is decidable when context/adversarial/joint
moves are simulated downwards in 0 steps, and successors are effectively computable. Proof technique:
Compute Kb, the finite basis for Succ∗(q◦1A). Check if t ∈↑ Kb. ⊡
3 Examples
In this section we put our proposed methodology to test by applying it in situations that demand resilience
of a system to an adversary. Our examples proceed from finite to finite-control to infinite state systems.
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In each case, we apply the methodology of identifying the core computation that would have sufficed in
the absence of an adversary. We then identify an adversary and show how by constructing an absorptive
context satisfying the self-similarity conditions presented earlier, one can defeat the adversary. The wqo
notion used is usually simple, though the later examples, involving resilience in distributed systems,
motivate the need for more flexible notions than simple embedding of a process into a context. However,
they retain the essential semantic requirement that the context preserves the ability of a process to perform
its actions, and that the context neither contributes any observable actions directly, nor does it take away
the observables of the core process. It can at best interact with other parts of the context and/or with the
adversary.
3.1 White Noise to defeat Side-channel Attacks
Let c be a deterministic finite computation which generates an observable result m in n steps: c−→n c′ ↓
m. Normally, observers cannot see the number of steps taken by c. Let us now consider an adversary that
can see in addition to this outcome, the “side property” of how many steps were taken to termination4.
If it observes that c terminates within n steps, it flags err. A class of step-counting adversaries can be
coded as A(i,k) for k ≥ 0, with the behaviour of the composite transition system c◦A(i,n) given by the
following rules:
p −→ p′
p◦A(i,n) −→ p′ ◦A(i+1,n)
p ↓ m
p◦A(i,n) ↓ m
p ↓ m
p◦A(i,n) ↓ err
(i ≤ n)
Note that the adversary does not suppress any observable of p, and makes no observable moves except
signalling err. In the absence of an adversary monitoring the side-channel, we have c◦1A ⇓ m, but in the
presence of such an adversary, c◦A(0,n) ⇓ err as well. Thus if c1 is a program behaviourally equivalent
to c but which takes more than n steps to terminate, this adversary can distinguish between c and c1 as
c1 ◦A(0,n) 6⇓ err.
We now justify the correctness of the method of interleaving a computation with an indeterminate
number of NOPs to defeat such side-channel attacks. Let WhiteNoise be a computation that consumes
cycles, but does not generate any observables, e.g., WhiteNoise −→ WhiteNoise. WhiteNoise does not
suppress or alter any normal observables of computations running in parallel/interleaved with it. Con-
sider the context C[ ] = WhiteNoise‖ f [ ], and suppose ‖ f is a weakly fair (nondeterministic5) interleaved
implementation of parallel composition that executes at least one step of WhiteNoise. Now note that
while C[c]◦A(0,n) ⇓ m, it is no longer the case that C[c]◦A(0,n) ⇓ err. Thus A(0,n) cannot distinguish
between C[c] and C[c1].
It is straightforward to show that C[ ] and A(0,n) satisfy the self-similarity conditions. We cast the
composite system as a WSTS, using the “self-similar subterm” ordering on processes. In particular, we
consider as minimal elements (which form a finite basis) all processes c′ such that c−→∗ c′. The effective
pred-basis is then easy to compute. It is therefore easy to prove that C[c] ◦A(0,n) ≈ c. Note also that
this context C[ ] is idempotent; reiterating it, as in C[C[c]], does not provide further security against this
side-channel attack.
4Other side properties such as heat generated, or power consumed could also be monitored.
5If the interleaving performs a deterministic number of Whitenoise steps, then by a small extension to the adversary class,
one can mount a side-channel attack.
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3.2 Replicated server
The next example involves finite-control, and justifies the use of repetition to address multiplicity of
requests and spatial replication to counter failure. Consider a one-time provider of a file v: OTP = av,
where a is the channel on which v is sent. Similarly, a basic client is rendered as BCi = ax.dix, which
receives some file x on the channel a, and delivers it to the client’s application layer, written as dix. The
single-request client-provider system is written as Sys1 = (a)(BC1‖OTP). The only observable barb of
Sys1 is the unrestricted send action d1v.
If the file provider has to deal with more than one client, or if the client repeatedly requests the file,
we need an ever-obliging responsive server, represented as a process that can repeatedly send file v on
the channel a.
Server = ℓ1[|! [av]|].
Typically, the server is located at some site ℓ1, written in a distributed calculus (e.g., [18]) as ℓ1[|. . .|],
which may be different from the client’s site. For simplicity we have the Server located at ℓ1 repeatedly
sending the file over a to whoever wishes to receive it6. In the distributed setting, note that p −→ p′
implies ℓ1[|p|]−→ ℓ1[|p′|], and p ↓ o implies ℓ1[|p|] ↓ o only when site ℓ1 is “up” (locations do not figure
in the observable barbs). Observe that the context in which OTP is placed contributes no barbs, and has
a hole in a position that is enabled. Consider the new system:
Sys2 = (a)(BC1‖ . . .BCn‖Server)
The observable barbs are div, for i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}. Since a is restricted, the send actions on a do not
contribute any observable barb. This construction also handles the case when the clients repeatedly
request a value, i.e., when BCi = !(ax.dix).
Now consider an adversary A that can cause location ℓ1 to fail, taking the server down permanently in
the fail-stop model (see e.g., [3, 18]) after which no client can receive any file from the Server. Observe
that the requirement that ℓ1 needs to be “up” for a barb to be observable means that the coupling with
the adversary is not monotone. The adversary can be modelled as a transition system with states that
represent the set of locations that are “up” and the transition {ℓ1} −→ {} to model the failure of ℓ1. It is
now possible to have trace suffixes in which Sys2 ◦A 6⇓ div whereas Sys2 ◦1A ⇓ div, for some value(s) of
i. Thus, Sys2 is not resilient to an adversary that can cause a single location to fail.
We build a server resilient to a single node failure by replicating the responsive file provision on two
sites, ℓ1 and ℓ2. Fault tolerance is provided by using the two hole context
Crep[ ] = ℓ1[|![ ]1|] ‖ ℓ2[|![ ]2|]
that places a process in two holes both at head positions, and satisfying all the requisite self-similarity
conditions for the context, yielding a replicated responsive server:
RepServer =Crep[OTP] ≡ ℓ1[|!av|]‖ℓ2[|!av|].
The server process located at ℓi can execute only if that location has not failed (fail-stop model of failure)
— it provides the value v on channel a while its site is up. Let
Sys3 = (a)(BC1‖ . . .BCn‖RepServer)
6Typically this is coded (in a pi-calculus) as a client sending a request to a server, sending a private channel over which it
wishes to receive the file.
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Client BCi can read a value on channel a either from the server at ℓ1 or ℓ2, whichever is up; if both are
up, it obtains the value from either one (the location of the server is not observable). So if either or both
ℓi are up, then . . .BCi . . .‖RepServer ⇓ div.
The adversary A, which is able to cause at most one node to fail, can be modelled by a finite state
machine, which may make a transition from a state in which both {ℓ1, ℓ2} are up, to states where ℓ1
(respectively ℓ2) is down, and then remains in that state (modelling fail-stop of at most one of the two
sites). The benign adversary 1A can be modelled as a single-state FSM (with a self-loop). It is easy to
formulate the composite system as a WSTS, by using the self-similar subterm ordering on processes,
and the obvious trivial ordering on the adversary FSMs. It is also easy to exhibit the minimal elements
and the effectiveness conditions for this system. Thus we can prove that Sys3 ◦ A ≈ Sys2 ◦ 1A. This
being a finite-control system, the proof is quite easy. Our WSTS-based framework is also able to handle
extensions to the system to permit persistent clients, which repeatedly request the file and deliver it ad
nauseum.
Replicating RepServer again by placing it in Crep[ ] serves no purpose with respect to an adversary
that can cause only one of the ℓi to fail7. However, if the adversary can cause k > 1, to fail, then a
replication context should place the server at least k+1 locations.
3.3 Reliable transmission
We now address resilience to adversaries that make communication channels unreliable. Instead of
presenting yet another verification of the ABP protocol [4] and its bisimulation proofs, which have been
published several times before (e.g., [13]), we describe a small protocol for communication between a
client R and a server Sr over a channel c that may arbitrarily reorder messages and omit messages. This
protocol can be used as a basic building block within a larger protocol that builds a FIFO channel over
a non-FIFO layer [1]. To our knowledge, this construction has not been earlier presented in as simple a
formulation. Its core is similar to the “probe” construct of Afek and Gafni [7].
The server is extremely simple: it receives a request on channel b, and sends a message on channel
c. At any point of time, it may segue to sending another value v′.
Sr(v) = (b.cv.Sr(v))+Sr(v′),
where v′ 6= v and v,v′ ∈D, some set of values (which we assume for convenience is of cardinality k). The
server is representable as a (parameterised) non-deterministic finite-control machine.
A simple client Rs can be expressed as: Rs = b.cx.dx.Rs, where Rs sends requests on b and, on
receiving a value on channel c, delivers it over channel d and repeats. If channel c does not omit or
reorder values, Rs will produce all the values sent by the server in FIFO order. If, however, b,c are lossy
channels, then some requests (or responses) may be lost in transmission. Rs may therefore get stuck
waiting for messages. We make the client more persistent, modifying Rs to Ro,
Ro =![b]1 ‖ [cx]2.[dx]3.Ro
which decouples the (repeated) request sending on b from the receipt of messages on c. Since it works
with lossy channels, Ro may omit delivering some messages, but all delivered messages appear in the
order in which they were sent. Note that we have placed the three communication actions in three distinct
“holes” ([ ]1, [ ]2, [ ]3 ).
7This is true even when the language permits nested sublocations.
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If, however, the channel c can reorder messages, it is possible to confuse messages corresponding
to earlier requests with those for later requests. While this problem can be addressed by placing serial
numbers on the messages, an interesting question is whether it can be solved without that mechanism.
Accordingly, we modify the client:
Rro(p,n1, . . . ,nk) = [b]1.Rro(p+1,n1, . . . ,nk)
+R′(p,n1, . . . ,nk)
R′(p,n1, . . . ,nk) = [cx]2.case x of
.
.
.
vi : if (ni > 0) then
Rro(p−1,n1, . . . ,ni−1, . . . ,nk)
else [dx]3.Rro(0, p−1, . . . , p−1)
.
.
.
The client initiates a round of the protocol by sending a request to the server on channel b. Since the
responses from the server may be reordered or dropped by the response channel c, the client has no way
of knowing whether a response it receives is acknowledging its current request (a “fresh” message), or
whether it is a response to a previous request. However, by pigeon-holing, if it receives more responses
than pending unanswered requests from the past, it knows that the server has acknowledged its most
recent request. For this it keeps a variable p, which is the number of requests sent in this round, and
bounds the number of responses it requires for each value so that when it receives a response on c, it
can determine that it has got enough responses to safely conclude that the value is a fresh one. Note
that in our soution, the server remains unchanged, and in the client, all the parameters take non-negative
integral values.
Let Aro be an adversary that may reorder and omit messages (the interesting ability of the adversary
lies in its being able to reorder responses on channel c), and let Ao be an adversary that may only omit
messages on channel c. The equivalence to be established is:
(b)(c)(Sr‖Rro(0,0, . . . ,0))◦Aro ≈ (b)(c)(Sr‖Ro)◦Ao
One may notice that the process Ro is not exactly syntactically embedded within a context in Rro.
However, the essence of the self-similarity constraints is met as every communication action comes into
an enabled position at exactly corresponding points marked by the holes [ ]1, [ ]2, [ ]3. Thus, the resulting
ordering on processes  would (while still being decidable) be more complex, but nonetheless adheres
to the self-similarity requirements and those of being a WSTS. In defining the states of the coupled
transition system we consider the states of the server Sr, and that of the client Ro and Rro. In identifying
the latter, we demarcate as significant the three marked holes as points where to pin control. The start
of a “round” is a significant point where the control of the Ro process is matched with that of the Rro
process. We take into account the parameters of the Rro process in framing the  relation. Finally, we
consider the channel states, adapting the subword ordering that has been used for lossy channels in order
to deal with lossy-reordering channels. The details are omitted here, but WSTS technique provides a
novel way of proving operationally the correctness of a protocol that has an unbounded state space.
By orienting this protocol in both directions, one can, at the price of counters (for the pending and
new messages) obtain an implementation of a FIFO channel over a lossy reordering communication
channel. The only way we know to avoid the counters is using sequence numbers on data items, as
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in [19], but this implies an infinite message alphabet. For practical purposes, one usually assumes that
sequence numbers can be recycled (in a “sliding window” fashion) under the belief that the channel does
not deliver an “ancient” message. On similar lines, if one assumes a bound on the number of messages the
channel may delay, then our counters can be limited by that bound. This may be a reasonable assumption
since, as shown in [1], in any implementation of a FIFO channel over a lossy reordering one with a finite
message alphabet, the more the messages that the channel delays, the more the messages that need be
transmitted.
4 Conclusion
The question of whether a specified program behaviour can be achieved versus an arbitrary adversary
is, of course, undecidable in general, with several famous impossibility results. Even the question of
whether a given program is resilient to some particular adversary is in general not decidable.
What we have sought to do is to formalise an intuitive connection between resilience to an adversary
and the self-similarity in the structure and behaviour of a program. It is a prescriptive framework, and
we recognise that there are several other ways of correctly constructing fault-tolerant systems that do
not fit this methodology. The program is constructed in terms of its core functionality (that generates
the observables) and an absorptive context that soaks up the adversarial actions, but otherwise neither
contributes nor detracts from the observable behaviour of a program8. While in our framework, we
require that the adversary’s moves are not directly observable (except in a denouement), the interaction
between the adversary and the program may result in different observables from the normal execution.
However, a fault-resilient program exhibits no difference.
Another way of thinking about the framework we have proposed is in terms of abstractions that
operate as follows: consider the traces of the system by itself, and also those of the system composed
with the adversary. Consider the equivalence relation that arises from an abstraction function which has
the property of “stuttering” over moves by the adversary. A system may be considered tolerant of an
adversary if every adversarial transition is within an induced equivalence class. While there is a certain
simplicity to such an account, our proposed framework is richer in at least some respects: First, it is able
to account for moves made in conjunction between the adversary and the system (the interactive moves).
Second, it is able to relate the structure of the system with its behavioural self-similarity, and capture the
intuition that the seemingly redundant parts of a program provide resilience against adversaries.
We are unaware of any published work on relating self-similarity with resilience. While there has
been a body of work in which adversaries have been classified according to a partial order based on
the severity of their disruptive capabilities, and relativising the notion of behavioural equivalence based
on the adversary model, we believe this is less elegant or compelling than an account where a stan-
dard notion of behavioural equivalence is used. While we have used barbed bisimulation, other notions
of equivalence may be appropriate in certain settings, and may provide easier methods for proving re-
silience. Another shortcoming of the previous approaches is that the adversarial model was incorporated
into the syntax of the processes, whereas our approach supports more eclectic styles of specifying the
transition system of processes in the context of an adversary.
Further, while the previous approaches seem to be confined to finite (or at best finite state processes)
– where it is possible to find appropriate bisimulation relations, we are able to deal with a class of infinite-
state systems by couching the problem in a WSTS framework. Although there has been substantial work
on WSTSs, our use in proving systems to be fault-resilient seems to be novel. We believe that one can
8This factoring of a program into core and context cannot in general be automated.
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in this framework also deal with composite adversarial models by combining the fault-resilient contexts
in novel ways (e.g., embedding one kind of resilient context inside another), although this is beyond the
scope of the current paper.
As we have presented very simple examples and introduced no new mechanisms for resilience, it
may seem that the results are unsurprising. However, it is satisfying to not only confirm the correctness
of intuitive constructions and folklore but also find an effective basis for demonstrating their correctness.
It would be interesting to study whether our framework also provides a way of discovering minimal
constructions for resilience against particular adversaries.
Of course, our proposed methodology should be put to further tests. For instance, it would be inter-
esting to see whether techniques for building resilience in storage systems such as RAID [5] would be
amenable to these techniques. A major area which needs addressing concerns cryptographic protocols
and resilience in the face of cryptanalytic adversaries. The challenge there is to find the right notion of
structural orderings, and recognising the contexts that provide resilience. Another domain that deserves
greater study is coding theory and the use of redundant bits to provide error-correction. It is not obvious
in such techniques whether convergence (reaching fixed-points) can be obtained.
In the future, we would also like to explore conditions under which, given a specification of the op-
erational behaviour of the adversary, and the core functionality, it may be possible (if at all) to synthesise
the fault-resilient context. We would like to develop a framework analogous to those of Liu, Joseph et
al. where fault-tolerant versions of systems are developed using a stepwise refinement methodology, and
transformations dealing with combined fault models.
In the current paper, we have used an operational framework; in the future, we would like to explore
a logic-based formulation, using e.g., knowledge-based analysis techniques to reason about resilience in
the same way that correctness of distributed systems/protocols has been studied [8].
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